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Abstract 
The Baltic countries have been through a period of 15 years with fast changes in ownership 
and corporate governance structures. The privatization processes have been quite different in the 
three countries, but in the dynamics after privatization we see an increasing level of similarity in the 
adjustment of the ownership structure. We have followed the changes quite closely over the years 
both in quantitative research and in case studies. We focus on the most important institutions for 
corporate governance in legislation and enforcement, bankruptcy, company law, minority share-
holder protection as well as the development of the banking system and stock exchanges.  The pa-
per analyses the main trends in the development and show how all the three Baltic economies are 
heading toward a typical Continental European system of corporate governance based on quite con-
centrated blockholder ownership. 
 
Introduction – three governance problems and different corporate governance models 
Corporate governance can be defined in the short form as “the system by which businesses 
are directed and controlled” (Cadbury report 1992). According to the OECD (1999) it includes: “a 
set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stake-
holders” and it “provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the 
means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring performances are determined”.  By focusing on 
the different stakeholders1 I have used the following definition: “The system determining the distri-
bution on stake-holders of both the formal and the appropriated rights to control and financial re-
turns of the enterprise”.  Mygind (2001): This definition is part of the analytical stakeholder ap-
proach which also emphasizes the importance of the identity of the controlling stakeholder  
The separation of managers’ control and ownership is the background for the classical 
agency problem2: (). The manager (as agent) following his own interest in contradiction with the 
interests of the owners (the principal). The minority/majority problem is when the shareholder with 
the controlling votes makes the company follow activities which gives the controlling owner a dis-
proportionate part of the returns and in this way rights are appropriated from the minority owners. 
Finally, the problem in relation to the broad group of different stakeholders can be more vaguely 
                                                 
1 Groups with a specific interest in the company e.g. employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, local society…. 
2 Berle and Means, 1933. Jensen and Meckling, 1976. Fama and Jensen 1983. 
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defined as finding the balance between the interests of these different stakeholders. This is more 
precisely discussed in Mygind (2006.) 
There is often a trade off when solving the three governance problems and there cannot be 
defined one single model which best takes care of the three problems. The different models for cor-
porate governance used in different countries show a high degree of variation. They differ in the 
weights given to the solution of the three problems and in the distribution of rights between the dif-
ferent stakeholders. The variations relates to the difference in market situation, the surrounding in-
stitutions – legislation, state regulation, functioning of the judiciary system, the development of 
banking and capital markets as well as the more specific structure of corporate governance – rules 
for disclosure, accountability of the manager and company board, board structure and especially the 
concentration of ownership and the identity of the dominating owners. Specific combinations of all 
these variables mean that each country has its specific corporate governance model. To simplify we 
will distinguish between three main groups: The Anglo-American market based model; the German 
bank based model and the Latin (South European) family blockholder model. 
In all the three models the competition on the product market is quite developed setting the 
framework for the scope of decisions for the managers. It has been a key part of the transition proc-
ess to build up the product market with high competitive pressure. We will go deeper into the transi-
tion process in the following sections with focus on privatization and the development of institu-
tions - areas with important differences between the three corporate governance models.  
An important difference (La Porta et al 1999) is the role of legislation where the Anglo-
American tradition of case based common law means more detailed regulation and higher protec-
tion of the investors in relation to managers and protection of minority owners in relation to major-
ity owners. The legislation gives a strong backing for small investors and is an important base for 
the strong development of a quite diversified ownership structure with many small shareholders in 
most large corporations. This is also the basis for strong and highly liquid capital markets. In the 
early 20th Century US introduced restrictions for banks in relation to ownership of companies both 
as a reaction against the powerful financial based thrusts in the start of the Century and as response 
to the domino effects of bankruptcies after the crisis starting in 1929. Therefore, we do not see 
banks playing the role as strong owners in the Anglo-American-model. 
This is in contrast to Germany where banks played a key role in the industrialization process 
in late 19th early 20th Centuries. With large shareholdings and through their role as custodians for 
smaller shareholders the banks controls a high share of the shareholder votes and in this way they 
control many of the large corporations in Germany. In the Latin model like in Italy the banks are 
not so strong and the controlling owner is not a bank, but simply a large blockholder – often the 
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founder family. Continental Europe has the legal tradition of civil law where the control of the man-
ager and the protection of minority owners are not as strong and detailed as in US.   
In the Anglo-American market based model the owner-manager governance problem is 
solved both through detailed legislation and through pressure from the capital market and the con-
nected market for managers. If the manager is not following the interests of the shareholders the 
share price on the capital market will fall relatively to other companies in the same field. The low 
price signals to the shareholders to unite and go for a change in management at the general meeting 
of shareholders. Small shareholders may instead use their exit option and sell their shares hereby 
increasing the downward pressure of prices. This leaves the company open for a hostile takeover of 
a raider buying enough shares for getting control, firing the manager and restructuring the company. 
In this way the capital markets functions as the turning point for the owners’ control of managers 
supported by a legal system which secures that the minority owners get their proportionate share. 
In the blockholder system of continental Europe the controlling owner simply controls man-
agement directly through strong positions in the company board. Here, there is a trade off in relation 
to the minority shareholders. Their interests may be threatened by the controlling owner giving rise 
to the majority-minority problem. Bank based dominant control may to a higher extent play the role 
as defending the interest of the pure shareholder while a blockholder with specific stakeholder in-
terests e.g. as a supplier may to a higher degree make transfer pricing etc and in this way use the 
dominant position to exploit the minor shareholders (Mygind 2006). 
The third governance problem in relation to different stakeholders is balanced in different 
ways in the three models. In the Anglo-American model different stakeholder groups may use the 
market to put pressure on the companies. E.g. political consumer groups stop buying certain goods 
produced by child-labor. This may force companies to change their practices like we have seen 
many large multinational companies introducing strong Corporate Social Responsibility policies in 
the later years. The stock exchanges have introduced specific lists for social responsible investments 
fulfilling certain conditions for labor rights, environment etc.   
In other countries, state regulation and/or strong union pressure prescribes a certain behavior 
of the companies. The German model includes codetermination where employees are strongly rep-
resented in the company boards of large corporations.  
The transition from plan to market includes both a change in governance on the political level and 
on the enterprise level. The political transition have been done quite fast in most countries while the 
economic transition have been a long and difficult process where the more refined institutions con-
nected to a fully developed system for corporate governance are still under development. Therefore, 
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it is relevant to ask the question: Which model of corporate governance is developing in the Baltic 
countries? 
 
Transition and changing institutions. 
To understand the development of corporate governance in the Baltic countries it is neces-
sary to have a closer look at the special conditions caused by the transition from command to mar-
ket economies. The command economy was a specific model of enterprise governance where the 
control rights were centralized in the plan bureaucracy, but where the managers still had some scope 
of action giving rise to agency problems and strong problems related to incentives and flexibility. 
To introduce the new market system with decentralized decision making and new incentives it was 
necessary to build up a new set of institutions. Although the political change and the building up of 
the new democratic political system could be done rather fast it turned out that the building up of 
new institutions for a market economy including functioning corporate governance has been a long 
process of which some elements are still developing. The institutions in focus for this analysis is 
first the privatization process transferring ownership from the state to new private stakeholders and 
building up a new set of rules defined in legislation on company law, regulation of capital markets 
and banks, bankruptcy legislation etc. Often the legislation is quite advanced, but the implementa-
tion through the state bureaucracy and the enforcement through the judiciary system lacks behind. 
The actual development of the new capital markets with banking system, stock exchange, and other 
financial institutions must also be in focus for the analysis.  
The structure of production at the start of transition was adjusted to the command model and 
it was necessary to adjust to the new market system with new products, new production methods, 
new markets etc. Therefore, the process of building up the new institutional system happened in 
interaction with strong restructuring of production where most enterprises in the first years of transi-
tion were in deep crisis because their old products could not be sold at a profit and their resources, 
skills, capital, contacts etc. for the necessary restructuring were limited. 
 
These initial conditions with weak institutions meant that insiders had some advantages rela-
tive to outside owners, but the fast development of institutions and markets and the strong need for 
restructuring changed the possibilities for different stakeholders to be effective owners of the enter-
prises. This meant that the initial type of ownership determined by privatization often changed quite 
fast. We have a compressed ownership cycle and a fast development of the corporate governance 
model (Jones and Mygind 2005). Let us look closer at the Baltic experience. 
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Privatization  
Differences in starting conditions and in political development meant that different paths 
were chosen for changing the ownership structure from a planned system to a market system based 
on private ownership (see table 1)3. Before independence, employee takeovers implied that control 
was taken away from central authorities in Moscow to the Baltic Republics. When this goal was 
accomplished in Estonia and Latvia in 1991 the next goal was both to strengthen the position of the 
titular population in relation to the large Russian-speaking minority. In Estonia the nationalist-
oriented policies meant that the period supporting broad employee takeovers of enterprises was very 
short and except for a few experiments only covered the early privatization of small and medium 
sized enterprises. This was also the case in Latvia, but here a large group of small and medium sized 
enterprises initially leased by their employees were later formally taken over by employees. There-
fore, we also have some privatizations to employees later in the process in Latvia. In Lithuania, 
with a negligible Russian-speaking minority, workers in general had a stronger political role. Em-
ployee-takeovers were implemented in medium and large enterprises in the early years of transition 
with the “Program of Initial Privatization”, LIPSP.  
In Lithuania there was strong resistance against selling out property to foreign investors. 
Lithuanians feared Russian takeovers and the policy was for a long period quite restrictive towards 
FDI. Estonia, on the other hand, implemented very liberal rules for foreign capital, opening up the 
economy to the inflow of especially Finnish and Swedish capital. With a few years delay Latvia 
followed the Estonian path for large privatization. 
 
Table 1. Overview over privatization 
 Private 
% GDP 
Large 
priv. 
Small 
Priv. 
Main 
method 
Secondary 
method 
Peak 
years 
Estonia 80 4 . 4+ direct sale voucher 1994-95 
Latvia 70 4 - 4+ direct sale voucher 1996-97 
Lithuania 75 4 . 4+ insider/voucher direct sale 1992-94 
Based on Mygind 2000, and EBRD 2005, scores for privatization range from 1 = none to 4+ = full. 
 
 In the former Soviet Union, the first movements in the direction of private enterprises be-
gan during the second half of the 1980es in the form of new cooperatives, individual firms, leasing 
and joint ventures (Bim, Jones and Weisskopf, 1993). Similar developments took place in the Bal-
tics, especially in Estonia, which functioned as a laboratory for market reforms in the USSR. “Small 
state enterprises” with semi-private spin offs from state owned enterprises were part of this devel-
                                                 
3 For a deeper analysis see Mygind 1997 and 2000. 
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opment. Also in Latvia, rapid development of new-cooperatives made an early start of private en-
trepreneurship. Most of these firms had a strong element of employee ownership although often 
they were de facto controlled by managers. 
 All three countries had large voucher schemes involving most residents. In Estonia and 
Latvia the bulk of vouchers were related to the privatization of land and housing while in Lithuania 
65 per cent of the vouchers were used in enterprise privatization in the LIPSP program - in Estonia 
only 28 per cent and in Latvia 42 per cent (Mygind 2000). In Estonia and Latvia most of these 
vouchers went to broad public offerings of minority holdings after the sale of the majority to a core 
investor. Investors could also finance a big share of the down payment by vouchers in the tender 
privatizations. Although the LIPSP privatization in Lithuania resulted in a more diversified owner-
ship structure than the tender privatizations in Estonia and Latvia, in most cases a core group of 
owners, most often insiders, acquired a majority of shares often mainly for vouchers.  
 Because of the limited role of vouchers in enterprise privatization in Estonia and Latvia 
investment funds were not important. In Lithuania 300-400 investment funds were started in rela-
tion to the LIPSP program. While many funds were used as a mechanism enabling a group of insid-
ers to take control of their companies, some of them developed into more orthodox investment 
funds representing a high number of investors and with a diversified portfolio in a large number of 
companies. However, there were severe governance problems, giving the shareholders too little 
influence on the administrators, resulting in asset stripping of many funds. When the regulation was 
tightened in 1997, most of the investment funds were dissolved.  
 The timing of privatization of small enterprises was quite similar for the three countries. 
The majority of small enterprises were privatized 2-3 years after the start of transition. However, for 
the medium and large enterprises there were marked differences. With the LIPSP program, Lithua-
nia was at its peak of privatization in 1993 and larger enterprises were privatized by the end of 
1994. However, in most companies some shares remained state owned, and in some very large 
companies only around 10 per cent of the shares were privatized. In total only around 50 per cent of 
the capital was privatized in the companies involved. In Estonia privatization had its greatest mo-
mentum by 1994 and most large enterprises were privatized by the end of 1995. In Latvia privatiza-
tion gained momentum in 1995-96 to peak in 1997, and large privatization was nearly accomplished 
by the end of 1998. Looking at the largest enterprises in utilities and infrastructure, Estonia was 
fastest followed by Latvia. While being fastest in the first round, Lithuania was slowest in the last 
round of privatization although it regained momentum in 1998. 
 Foreign investors played only a minor role in the privatization of small enterprises. The 
advantages for insiders crowded out the possibilities for outsiders, especially foreign investors. In 
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Lithuania foreigners had a weak position not only in small privatization, but also in the LIPSP pri-
vatization. Foreigners got opportunities to start up new firms somewhat faster in Estonia than in the 
other Baltic countries. Estonia was the first country to promote foreign investment in relation to 
large privatization. In the tender process, foreign investors had a strong position because of their 
access to capital, management skills, and international business networks. From 1993 foreigners 
took over many of the largest enterprises under privatization. By the end of 1998 foreigners had 
taken over approximately one third of enterprise assets included in large privatization. Latvia started 
the same process in the autumn of 1994 and the foreign share of purchase was 38 per cent for the 
years 1994-1998. In Lithuania the LIPSP privatization gave very little room for foreigners, and only 
4 enterprises were taken over by foreign investors in “the privatization for hard currency” of 46 
enterprises in the period up to 1995. After LIPSP the pace of privatization stagnated and not until 
1998 did foreign capital start to play an important role in privatization in Lithuania (Mygind 2000).  
 
Table 2   Overview of institutions related to corporate governance 
 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Bankruptcy system  
 
Insolvency law EBRD 2004 
Strict legislation 92, 
tough enforcement 
medium compliance 
Strict legislation 96, 
tighter enforcement 
low compliance 
Strict legislation 97, 
tighter enforcement 
very low compliance
Governance   EBRD score* 
EBRD governance-score   
   competition-regulation 
governance law EBRD 2004 
1995    2000     2005
    3          3           4- 
    2          3-          3- 
medium compliance 
1995    2000     2005 
    2         3-           3 
    2         2+          3- 
high compliance 
1995    2000     2005 
    2          3-          3 
    2          3-          3 
high compliance 
Bank market 
number of banks (foreign) 
state owned bank assets % 
foreign own.bank assets % 
loans to private  % of GDP 
bad loans % of total loans 
bank regulation   
EBRD-score: banking 
1995    2000     2005 
19(5)    7(4)    13(10)
  9.7        0.0       0.0 
             97.4     99.4 
14.0      23.3     58.9 
  2.4        1.3       0.2    
strict already 1992 
   3           4-         4 
1995    2000     2005 
42(11)  22(6)  23(10) 
  9.9        2.9       4.3 
             74.4     57.9 
  7.5      17.9     67.4    
19.0        4.5       0.7  
strict  from 1994 
    3          3          4- 
1995    2000     2005 
15 (0)   13 (6)  12 (6)
61.8      38.9       0.0 
             54.7     91.7  
15.2      10.0     34.0    
17.3      10.8       0.7 
strict  from 1995 
    3           3          4- 
Stock market           Start 
 
May 1996 
1996    2000     2005 
July 1995 
1996    2000     2005  
September 1993 
1996    2000     2005 
Listed firms 
capitalization % of GDP 
turnover % of capitalization 
EBRD-score: non-banking  
  16         17          15 
 21.0     31.5      25.3   
13.0      18.9      51.1   
     2          3          3+
    34       17         12 
   3.0       7.3     16.8 
   8.0     48.6       4.6    
      2          2+        3 
  460        54        43 
 11.4     13.8     31.8   
   4.0     48.5     10.1    
      2          3          3 
EBRD Transition Report 2006, scores 1=none, 4+=full. Capital market data: central banks and stock exchanges. 
 
Overview over institutional development 
 Table 2 gives an overview of developments in the Baltics of the main institutions for the 
functioning and development of the governance structures at the enterprise level. Although the Bal-
tic countries started their transition two years later than the leading countries in Central Europe (Po-
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land, Czech Republic and Hungary) they are now on the same level. The legislation on bankruptcy 
procedures was quite advanced already in 1992 in Estonia. The law was strictly enforced and by 
1995 more than 1000 bankruptcies had already been implemented. Therefore, takeovers of liqui-
dated assets had an important role in the ownership dynamics in Estonia. In Latvia and Lithuania 
bankruptcy laws were also passed in 1992, but implementation was relatively weak. The legislation 
was strengthened in Latvia in 1996 and in Lithuania in 1997 and the implementation has been fur-
ther tightened in 2003 in Latvia and Lithuania. However, still according to EBRD (Legal indicator 
Survey 2004, EBRD 2004, annex 1.1) the law is deficient in several fields. Latvia scores “low com-
pliance” and Lithuania “very low compliance” when compared with international standards. The 
Insolvency Law does not provide sufficient clarity in the definition of ‘insolvency’ to prevent po-
tential abuses by creditors. In addition, the law grants insufficient supervisory powers to courts in 
restructuring processes. The Insolvency Law is particularly deficient in addressing other issues of 
reorganization including too high complexity of procedures. Estonia scores “medium compliance” 
in the assessment. In EBRD’s assessment of effectiveness of how the law works in practice there is 
still much room for improvements in all three countries. Still Estonia belongs to the best performing 
countries in the actual enforcement of insolvency cases well ahead of both Latvia and Lithuania. 
For Estonia the faster and tougher implementation of bankruptcy rules are also reflected in 
the slightly higher EBRD score for governance and enterprise restructuring in table 2. Estonia has 
been leading in company legislation and enforcement of this legislation. However, recent EBRD 
surveys on legislation and enforcement of rules indicates that Estonia is getting behind its two Bal-
tic neighbors in areas related to corporate governance (EBRD 2005, annex 1.2).  
 
Figure 1 - Estonia - Quality of corporate governance legislation (EBRD 2004) 
 
EBRD Corporate 
Governance Sector 
 Assessment 2004 
The extremity of 
each axis represents 
an ideal score, i.e., 
corresponding to 
OECD Principles of 
Corporate Govern-
ance. The fuller the 
‘web’, the more 
closely the corpo-
rate governance 
laws of the country 
approximates these 
principles  
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The EBRD's 2004 Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, which assessed corporate 
governance related “laws on the books” rated Estonia as having achieved “medium compliance” 
when compared to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Shortcomings were found in the 
“responsibilities of the board” and “disclosure and transparency” sections, see figure 1. In Estonia 
the Commercial Code, issued in 1995 is the primary legislation concerning corporate governance. 
However, on 12 October 2005, the Estonian Parliament passed a major amendment to the Commer-
cial Code aimed at removing several flaws encountered in implementing the Code and at lifting 
excessively formal corporate requirements. Some parts of the Commercial Code have been clarified 
in the light of practice. Regulations concerning the rights and duties of companies’ management 
bodies have also been improved. The amendments entered into force on 1 January 2006. With these 
recent changes Estonia will probably have a higher rating in the next EBRD assessment on the qual-
ity of legislation. For the institutional framework it should also be mentioned that Tallinn Stock 
Exchange recently adopted a Corporate Governance Code. On 1 January 2006 these “Corporate 
Governance Recommendations” entered into force and are intended to enhance corporate govern-
ance and transparency among listed companies. The Recommendations are enforced by regulations 
of the Tallinn Stock Exchange and are based on the “comply or explain” principle.  
 In 2005, the EBRD launched a survey for testing the effectiveness of corporate governance 
- how the law works in practice (EBRD 2006-Est). A case investigated the position of a minority 
shareholder seeking to access corporate information in order to understand if a related-party trans-
action was indeed entered into by the company and on how it was possible to obtain compensation 
in case damage was suffered. The effectiveness of legislation was measured according to four prin-
cipal variables: complexity, speed, enforceability and institutional environment. The survey re-
vealed that actions available to minority shareholders with less than 25% shareholding are limited 
and in general not very effective. Minority shareholders can call a general meeting to request infor-
mation from management, but they cannot adopt any decisions unless their action is backed by 
other shareholders representing the majority at the meeting. Also when considering redress, actions 
available to minority shareholders are limited, although much more effective. In this respect, proce-
dures are deemed clear and enforceability is generally not considered a particular issue by EBRD, 
although it might depend on the solvency of the debtor. In Estonia obtaining an executable judg-
ment can take more than 24 months if the dispute goes before the Supreme Court and it is consid-
ered easy for the defendant to delay the proceedings. However, Estonia’s institutional environment 
is considered sound as courts are deemed impartial and generally experienced and competent in 
corporate law cases, corporate information is reliable and statutory auditors are deemed fairly inde-
pendent from the controlling shareholder. 
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Figure 2 - Latvia - Quality of corporate governance legislation (EBRD 2004) 
 
  
 In Latvia the primary legislation governing corporate governance related issues includes 
the Commercial Law from 2000 with later amendments and the Financial Instruments Market Law. 
According to EBRD's 2004 Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, “laws on the books” in Lat-
via was rated as having achieved “high compliance”, when compared to the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance. Latvia scores high on minority investor protection (equitable treatment of 
shareholders) while some stakeholder issues scores somewhat lower, see figure 2. However, the 
2005 EBRD survey for testing the effectiveness of the practice of corporate governance showed 
some deficiencies in all variables: institutional environment, enforceability, complexity and speed. 
Actions available to minority shareholders are generally clearly provided for by the legislation, but 
case law offering guidance to legal provisions is not always available. The time needed to conclude 
the proceedings is usually limited (around 8 months for disclosure and 1 year for redress) although 
it may be quite easy for the defendant to delay the procedure. Finally, enforceability of judgements 
might be problematic and courts and prosecutors are not deemed well experienced and competent in 
corporate cases. Therefore, EBRD concludes that despite the fact that Latvia has in place good laws 
concerning corporate governance issues, continuing efforts still need to be made to improve the 
effective implementation and enforcement of existing legislation. It should also be mentioned that 
the Riga Stock Exchange has followed the trend and in December 1995 they issued their Principles 
of Corporate Governance (1995). Listed companies will be required to issue a compliance statement 
in relation to this corporate governance code starting from 2007 (Wymeersch, 2006). 
 In Lithuania the Law on Companies is the most important legislative document dealing 
with corporate governance. In April 2004 the Vilnius Stock Exchange approved a Corporate Gov-
EBRD Corporate 
Governance Sector 
Assessment, 2004 
The extremity of each 
axis represents an 
ideal score corre-
sponding to OECD 
Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance.  
The fuller the ‘web’, 
the more closely the 
corporate governance 
laws of the country 
approximates these 
principles  
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ernance Code and the LSC endorsed it. The Code includes a set of requirements that listed compa-
nies are invited to observe on a purely voluntary basis. A new version of the Code was approved in 
August 2006. It incorporates a new "comply or explain" approach.  
 
Lithuania - Quality of corporate governance legislation 
 
  
 In EBRD's 2004 Corporate Governance Sector Assessment Lithuania’s “laws on the 
books” were rated as having achieved “high compliance”, when compared to the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance. As shown in the chart above only minor shortcomings were found in the 
“responsibilities of the board” and “rights of shareholders” sections. Among those, the assessment 
evidenced that the law is silent on board’s functions as ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s 
accounting and financial reporting systems and does not require the board to include a sufficient 
number of non-executive and independent directors. This is recommended, however, in the Corpo-
rate Governance Code. 
 The EBRD survey for testing the effectiveness of corporate governance in relation to mi-
nority protection revealed that legislation in Lithuania is quite effective and only minor problems 
have been evidenced. Related-party transactions are however not well detailed in the legislation and 
this might render the procedures complex and the burden of proof heavy. The time needed to con-
clude the proceedings is usually under 6 months when seeking disclosure although in case of appeal 
the time needed to obtain an executable judgment can exceed two years. Enforceability of judg-
ments is not considered to be a problem. Turning to the institutional environment, the survey indi-
cates that company information is generally reliable, which enhances the possibility to obtain dis-
closure. When considering redress, the survey reported a lack of experience of the lower courts in 
corporate law cases. 
 
EBRD Corporate 
Governance Sector 
Assessment, 2004 
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The development of the financial institutions 
 Early in the transition process state-owned banks were split into a two-tier system with a 
Central Bank and a number of commercial banks to be privatized later in the process. This privati-
zation was performed fastest in Estonia peaking in 1995, in Latvia in 1996, and in Lithuania in 
2001. A large number of new private banks were established in the early years of transition to ser-
vice some of the large enterprises. Many of these banks had a weak capital base, but the develop-
ment of the financial sector shows a strong consolidation with a falling number of banks and a de-
velopment of banking activities from simple money transfers to deepening the main activity of 
channeling savings from the population to lending to companies. Latvia has the highest number of 
banks of which still some relatively small niche-banks servicing CIS-markets (EBRD 2006).  
Most transitional countries have been through severe financial crises. In Estonia, already in 
1992-93 the financial system was strengthened after a major financial crisis. In Latvia the regulation 
were made more strict around 1995 disclosing serious weaknesses in the largest commercial bank. 
This bank was closed down, Latvian savers had huge losses and the banking crisis gave a push to 
the whole Latvian economy. In Lithuania three of the largest banks were in crisis in 1995/96.  
In all three countries the largest banks were taken over by foreign, mainly Scandinavian, 
banks in the end of the 1990’es and in the start of the new millennium. In later years we have seen a 
steep fall in the share of non-performing loans and a steep increase in loans to the private sector -  
both loans to private persons, mainly for mortgage and car loans, and to enterprises. The boom in 
investments in construction of residential buildings and in fixed assets in enterprises is to a high 
degree driven by falling real interest rates and the stronger role of banking.  As seen in table 2 Esto-
nia has been leading this development, but Latvia and a bit later Lithuania are strongly catching up. 
 From our surveys, discussed below, we find that banks are not playing a strong role as 
owners and are seldom represented in the boards of the enterprises. Although the legislation does 
not make important barriers for bank ownership it seems that the German bank-dominated model is 
not what is developing in the Baltic countries.  
 
Non-banking financial markets 
 Tallinn Stock Exchange opened in May 1996. Before that time some trading of shares had 
taken place in the over-the-counter market. The privatization through public offerings of minority 
shares facilitated the development of the exchange, but there was no strong relation between the 
privatization process and the development of the stock exchange. Tallinn Stock Exchange is charac-
terized by a small number of companies, but with relatively high capitalization and turnover. Capi-
talization and turnover on the Riga Stock Exchange have been considerably lower than in Estonia. 
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However, following the acceleration of privatization of large companies and the associated public 
offerings of shares, the Latvian stock exchange has developed quite rapidly in recent years. The 
National Stock Exchange of Lithuania was established in September 1993, closely connected to the 
LIPSP privatization process. Although more than 600 enterprises were listed, capitalization in rela-
tion to GDP was not higher in Lithuania than in Estonia and turnover was very low with thin trad-
ing of most companies. Most of them have later been delisted. The three Baltic stock exchanges 
have started a common Baltic list of blue-chip stocks.  
The three exchanges are now integrated into the Nordic OMX stock exchanges. This inte-
gration and the corporate governance codes issued in the latest years have further strengthened 
regulation and transparency. Furthermore, the legislation has been developed especially in relation 
to the EU accession in 2004. According to the EBRD Securities Markets Legislation Assessment 
conducted in 2005, Estonia was found to be in “high compliance” (almost reaching the “very high 
compliance”) with the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation published by the IOSCO. 
Lithuania was also found to be in “high compliance” while Latvia was found to be in “medium 
compliance”, but later legislation has probably now lifted Latvia to high compliance. This means 
that the legislation on listing of securities and disclosure are now up to EU standard in all three 
countries. However, it should be noted that for the overwhelming majority of Baltic enterprises, 
including those investigated in this article, the stock exchanges have no direct influence on their 
governance because they are not listed. 
The development of non-banking financial institutions belongs to the last stages of transi-
tion. Insurance companies are getting more consolidated and investment funds, venture capital 
funds, private equity are in their early stage. Different pension schemes have been introduced and 
are developing in strength in the later years. According to the EBRD strategy reports (2006) there 
are both mandatory and voluntary privately managed pension funds in Latvia and Lithuania while in 
Estonia only voluntary. Private pension funds and life insurance companies are beginning to accu-
mulate pools of household savings, but absolute volumes remain low. So though, pension funds are 
still in an early stage it can be forecasted that institutional investors related to these funds will have 
a strong role in the future like it is the case in most developed economies. The leasing sector is 
thriving in all three countries. 
 
Ownership identity and concentration - the compressed ownership cycle 
In developed market economies the typical governance cycle is, manager ? outside investor 
participation ? outside investor takeover (Jones and Mygind 2005). This cycle develops in parallel 
with a tendency for a change from concentrated to more diversified ownership. Specific governance 
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cycles are also determined by developments in the country’s institutional and cultural framework 
and by specific market developments. 
Because of the fundamental changes in institutions transitional economies with emerging 
and changing markets create specific transitional conditions for enterprises and their life-cycles. 
Privatization, pressures for restructuring and weak, but developing institutions define the conditions 
for the evolution of ownership structures. Therefore, specific transitional governance cycles can be 
predicted. Most medium and large enterprises have gone through a process of privatization. The 
specific method used for the change from state to private ownership determined the initial owner-
ship structure of the privatized enterprises.  
The weak institutions in the start of transition meant that the owner-manager governance 
problem was prevailing and outside ownership was relatively rare. This was combined with advan-
tages for insiders in the early privatization process. As mentioned earlier, Estonia and Latvia had a 
bias towards employee ownership in relation to small and medium firms, while in Lithuania the 
LIPSP privatization also enabled the introduction of employee ownership in quite large and capital-
intensive enterprises (Mygind 2000).  
Based on ownership surveys for several years in the three Baltic countries Jones and Mygind 
(2005) have investigated both the ownership structure just after privatization or start as a new enter-
prise and the later changes in ownership. In this way it has been possible to identify the specific 
ownership cycles developing in the Baltic countries. The analysis of the initial ownership structure 
shows that privatization and the specific conditions in early transition lead to a specific private own-
ership structure. Employee owned enterprises made up a large share of privatized enterprises in all 
three countries and they were especially related to early privatizations in both Estonia and Lithua-
nia. For Latvia employee owned firms were also frequent during later privatization when many 
companies that were initially leased by employees were fully privatized. Employee ownership was 
rare among new start ups – the exception being the new cooperatives started up in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s. Ownership concentration was lowest in employee owned enterprises, higher in firms 
owned by domestic external owners or managers, and highest in firms that were foreign owned.   
The dynamic analysis of ownership changes by Jones and Mygind (2005) shows that em-
ployee ownership was the least stable type of ownership and that the most frequent takeovers were 
undertaken by managers. The next step in the governance cycle for transition economies was from 
managerial ownership to outside ownership. Most often this involved a shift to external domestic 
ownership, but there were also cases of direct shifts to foreign ownership. Changes back to em-
ployee-dominated ownership were extraordinary.  External domestic ownership shifted quite fre-
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quently to foreign ownership. In this way the analysis strongly supports a transitional governance 
cycle of:  employee?manager?external domestic?foreign, sometimes with shortcuts.  
Some of the results are shown in the transition matrices in table 3. For Estonia it shows that 
while 99 out of 576 enterprises were majority employee owned at the first observation after 
start/privatization only 28 were still majority employee owned in 2002. This gives a rate of change 
of 71.9% much higher than is observed for the other ownership groups. The table also shows that 35 
went to managers, 22 to domestic owners, 8 to former employees and 6 to foreign owners. The 
same tendency is observed for both Latvia and Lithuania although the change-rates are lower be-
cause a shorter period is studied.  
Data not reported here shows that in general the ownership change is accompanied with an 
increase in concentration on the largest single owner4 (Jones and Mygind 2005). In some cases pri-
vatization lead to diversified outside domestic ownership. In such cases the cycle often started with 
a move from relatively diversified domestic ownership to more concentrated management owner-
ship following the cycle: diversified domestic?manager?outside concentrated ownership. The ten-
dency toward higher concentration also applies to enterprises with stable ownership, but it was es-
pecially strong for enterprises that changed their dominant ownership group. This was particularly 
the case for shifts away from employee ownership, but it was also quite strong for movements from 
domestic outsider to foreign ownership and also for shifts from foreign to domestic outsider owner-
ship. The reason behind this strong tendency towards higher concentration is that privatization led 
to an ownership structure that was too diversified in relation to the slow development of the institu-
tional framework. The low development of the banking sector during early transition meant that 
reinvestment of profits and extra equity capital from existing or new core owners was the main 
source for investment for the necessary restructuring. Small diversified shareholders and institu-
tional portfolio investors were rare and they were involved in only a handful of listed companies. 
Privatization to foreigners was allowed first in Estonia, thus foreign ownership as a starting 
point of the governance cycle was more frequent in Estonia than elsewhere. Later in Latvia and 
even later in Lithuania, enterprises were sold to a core investor, often foreign. This ownership struc-
ture is the last stage in transitional economies and thus relatively stable. This does not exclude the 
possibility for long run changes to other foreign investors or to new strong domestic investors. The 
speed of the adjustment process for ownership-types and the accompanying concentration processes 
were closely connected to the development of the surrounding governance institutions. Change was 
slow when, for example, property rights were uncertain, bankruptcy legislation was weakly en-
forced, and the financial system was too weak to play an important role in the financing of invest-
                                                 
4 While the ownership data goes back to the mid 1990s the concentration data, however, only covers the period from 
1997 in Latvia and from 2000 in Estonia 
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ments for enterprise restructuring. When institutional reform was successfully implemented the de-
velopment over the governance cycles speeded up, and countries with the fastest transition had most 
companies reaching the final stages of the specific transitional cycle (Jones and Mygind, 2005).  
 
Table 3a  Estonia - ownership transition matrix: privatization/start – 2002 Jones and Mygind 2005 
        \last year 
first year  
foreign Domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total Change 
Foreign 114 10 9 0 0 133 14,3%
Domestic 11 132 37 0 0 180 26,7%
Manager 8 22 107 3 0 140 23,6%
Employee 6 22 35 28 8 99 71,7%
Former emp. 0 4 3 2 15 24 37,5%
Total 139 190 191 33 23 576 
 
Table 3b Latvia - ownership transition matrix: 1997-1999                  
           \1999 
1997 
foreign Domestic manager employee   former 
  employee  
Total Change 
Foreign 110 8 5 0 0 123 10,6%
domestic 8 161 13 4 2 188 14,4%
manager 2 12 326 2 0 342 4,7%
employee 2 6 15 135 9 167 19,2%
Former 
empl 
0 16 0 6 73 95 23,2%
 122 203 359 147 84 915
 
Table 3c Lithuania - ownership transition matrix:  privatization/start – 2000        
          \2000 
priv/start 
foreign Domestic Manager employee former  
employee 
total Change 
Foreign 31 3 2 0 0 36 13.9%
domestic 2 70 6 1 3 82 14.6%
manager 3 5 69 6 0 83 16.9%
employee 6 10 33 41 3 93 55.9%
former emp 1 11 4 2 18 36 50.0%
Total 43 99 114 50 24 330 
Former employee ownership defined as domestic dominant with concentration < 20%. In the analysis of ownership 
dynamics we separate ownership by former employee from the group of domestic outsider dominated enterprises. We 
assume that low concentration or high diversification of external domestic owners can be understood as a situation 
where employee owners have left the company, but have kept their shares. A substantial part of the changes away from 
employee ownership can be explained by this process. This is supported by Kalmi 2002 and Estonian cases (Kalmi and 
Mygind, 2003). 
 
Estonia’s fast development of the financial sector, early tough bankruptcy legislation and in 
general the fastest institutional development encouraged a faster speed of change in the ownership 
cycle, than in the other countries. This is both because the optimal ownership structure converged to 
the western model at an earlier date and because the institutional development made easier the nec-
essary adjustments. Managers had better access to capital for takeovers from the more developed 
 18
banking system. Fast restructuring meant that employment was cut quite fast in the early stages of 
transition in Estonia. When employee owners left the company they often kept their shares and for 
employee owned companies this meant a change in ownership from employees to former employ-
ees. Finally, a fast transition process and development of the institutional system improved the 
business climate and attracted foreign investors facilitating a faster change of ownership structures 
in the direction of foreign ownership. Although there were quite important differences between the 
three Baltic countries in the privatization processes and the development of different governance 
institutions Jones and Mygind (2005) find that the similarities are more important. The corporate 
governance cycles followed the same patterns and were accompanied by a strong tendency for 
higher concentration. The main difference occurred in the speed of the adjustments. The change 
away from employee ownership was fastest in Estonia, and here also the level of concentration is 
significantly higher than for Latvia and Lithuania.  
To investigate the relation between ownership and control and to go deeper into compensa-
tion and restructuring we made manager surveys in all the three countries. In Estonia the survey was 
done in 1996-97 and included responses from 220 enterprises. In Latvia a similar survey was done 
in the spring of 1997 comprising 167 enterprises. In Lithuania the questionnaire was performed in 
the spring of 2000 and the result was 405 responses. We chose a stratified random sample of com-
panies with relatively high weight on larger companies. The questionnaires were sent to top-
managers, but most interviews were done on location and some by phone. The surveys were per-
formed by the statistical departments and the response rate was around 30% in Lithuania and 
around 60% in Estonia and Latvia. Some of the results are presented in table 4. 
Is there correspondence between type of ownership and board representation? This is a core 
question concerning the relation between ownership and control. Especially, in the Latvian and 
Lithuanian sample managers followed by other employees have strong positions in the company 
boards5  (Mygind 2002abc). In Estonia the representation of managers and other employees are con-
siderably lower although still the strongest groups on average. In all three countries, especially in 
Estonia, foreign owners have a strong position versus the insiders. We find correspondence between 
ownership and representation in the boards in insider owned and foreign owned enterprises while 
especially in external domestic enterprises and in the remaining enterprises with majority state 
ownership the owners are only weakly represented in the boards. This situation indicates that there 
may be a strong owner manager governance problem in these enterprises. 
 
                                                 
5 The results may be slightly biased because in some cases companies may have given answers for the management 
boards and not as indicated the company board (supervisory council). 
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Table 4a  Composition of company board on ownership – Estonia 1997  (Mygind 2002-Est)  
            \ ownership 1997 
average % of seats to 
representatives from: 
 
state  
 
fo-
reign
 
do-
mes-
tic 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ploy-
ee 
 
no 
ma-
jority
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
coop 
 
state/municipal     8     6    2    4    5   0    4    3    3    5 
Foreign    20    53    2    2    0    14    13    9   29 
domestic external owner    23    10   35   14    11    33   21   18   18   31 
Managers    30    25   33   47   44   36   36   41    26    26 
other employees   19     6   28    33   40   17   26   29   24   37 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
total N with seats > 1     6     33   57   40  21     5  162   62   64   31 
average number of seats    3    3     3     3     4     2     3     4     3     4 
N seats =0 or no answer     0     0     4     3     1     1     9     1     8     1
 
Table 4b  Composition of company board on ownership – Latvia 1996  (Mygind 2002-Lv)  
            \ ownership 1996 
average % of seats to 
representatives from: 
 
state  
 
for-
eign 
 
dom. 
 
mana-
ger 
 
em-
ploy-
ee 
 
no 
majo-
rity 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal 
 
 33    0    5    3   2  12 
 
   5 
 
4 4 
Foreign 
 
   0 46    2   6    0     6
 
   6 
 
2 12 
domestic external owner 
 
   5  14  24  16    4   22
 
 16 
 
15 18 
Managers 
 
 63  31  51  64  53   44
 
 53 
 
53 52 
other employees 
 
    0    9  18  11  40   16
 
 20 
 
 26 14 
Total 
 
100 100 100 100 100 100
 
100 
 
100 100 
total N with seats > 1 
 
    4    9  30  32  31  10
 
116 
 
66 46 
average number of seats 
 
    5    5    7    5    7    5
 
   6 
 
   6    5 
N seats = 0 or no answer 
 
  16    4    5   6    1    4
 
  46 
 
   5    25
 
  Table 4c  Composition of company board on ownership – Lithuania 1999  (Mygind 2002-Lt)  
            \ ownership 1999 
average % of seats to  
representatives from: 
 
state  
 
fo-
reign 
 
do-
mestic
 
mana-
Ger 
 
em-
ployee
 
no 
ma-
jority 
 
total 
 
priva-
tized 
 
new 
 
state/municipal     11     2    2    1    4   1    5    2    1 
Foreign    0    30    1    0    0    0 7    1   18 
domestic external owner    0    0   30   6    4    9   9   11   16 
Managers    51    61   52   62   39   54   53   52    49 
other employees   38     7   15    31   52   36   26   34   26 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
total N with seats > 1     43     16   74   50  26    66 275   200   28
 
average number of seats    4.9    4.4     4.3     4.3     5.1     4.8 4.6     4.5    4.3 
no board or no answer     21     18     24     46     7     14    130     47     59
Total N 64 34 98 96 33 80 405 254 87
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In all three countries the strong management representation in the boards is to a high degree 
mirrored in the perceived strong influence of the managers on all decision areas. The only exception 
is selection of managers where the owners have relatively high influence – higher or on the same 
level as managers. This corresponds with the answers on: Who appointed the managers? The com-
pany boards and the shareholders directly have appointed the large majority of the managers. The 
owners also have some say on long term plans, but here only foreign owners have similar influence 
as managers. Again it seems that the foreign owners are strongest in solving the owner-manager 
problem. The surveys in all three countries show that foreign owners are clearly the strongest exter-
nal group. Since the managers have very high influence even without ownership, the position as 
majority owner only increases their influence marginally.  
Banks have very little influence in Lithuanian companies. This is also connected to the lim-
ited role of bank loans for Lithuanian enterprises. Questions concerning bank influence were not 
included in the Estonian and Latvian surveys, but we assume that here the situation is quite similar 
to the Lithuanian case.  
Managers dominate decision making also in employee owned companies. The group of em-
ployee is in general perceived to have quite low influence on all issues. Except for a slight increase 
in relation to manager selection in Latvia and Lithuania employee ownership does not change the 
low influence of the employees. In general employees have most influence on safety and health, but 
again, ownership does not improve their position in these operational issues. Therefore, employee 
ownership with dominant management control seems to be quite widespread and for employee 
owned firms there is a strong owner-manager governance problem.  
Union membership is in general very low in all three countries. Unions play no role for em-
ployee influence and they are not represented in new enterprises. Share-ownership is the main 
channel for employee influence in most of the employee owned enterprises and in a high number of 
management owned and no-majority enterprises. This is related to relatively high employee minor-
ity shares in these companies.  
Quite few from the old guard had survived as managers when the survey was done in the 
end of the 1990es. This shows that the selection of managers was important in relation to the man-
ager-owner governance problem. There is quite small variation in the year the current manager was 
appointed. In state, employee and no majority enterprises around 20% of the Lithuanian managers 
dated back to the 1980’es. In this respect more of the old guard has survived in Lithuania than in 
Estonia and Latvia where less than 10% of the managers had their positions back from the 1980’es. 
In Lithuania and Estonia employee and manager owned enterprises had on average the longest 
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manager tenure, followed by foreign and no majority, while in Latvia managers were shifted more 
frequently in employee owned companies.  
Another instrument the owners can use to solve the owner-manager governance problem is 
performance related compensation to align the managers’ interests with the owners. When the sur-
vey was done performance related pay was widespread in the Lithuanian sample – much more than 
in Estonian and Latvia. There was profit-related pay in 60% and sales related pay in 27% of the 
Lithuanian enterprises in 1999. The corresponding numbers for Estonia in 1997 was 13% and 9% 
and for Latvia 19% of the firms had profit-related and 13% sales related pay for their managers in 
1996. However, the frequency was increasing over time for all three countries so some of the gaps 
between the countries have probably been narrowed in the later years. There was no significant 
variation between the owner-groups, in any of the three countries.  
 
Changing importance of the three governance problems over the transition process. 
The development of the corporate governance systems means that the three governance 
problems have had varying importance. The early high frequency of employee ownership in small 
and medium enterprises in Estonia and Latvia and a broader group of enterprises in Lithuania was 
an indicator for emphasis on employee-related stakeholder issues. The political position of the em-
ployees in early transition, especially in Lithuania, gave them a strong position in early privatiza-
tion. However, their limited resources for being strong owners in relation to management and the 
continuing practice of paternalistic management meant that the owner-manager problem was 
strongly present – the employee owners had de facto not much control.  
Still, employees were strongly represented in the boards in our surveys covering the end of 
the 1990es, especially, in companies with employee majority ownership. This meant some influence 
for employees when appointing the managers, but in other areas ownership did not enhance the in-
fluence of the employees. It is worth noting that external domestic owners had even lower influ-
ence, probably, due to the relatively dispersed ownership in this group.  The strong counterpart for 
the managers was found in foreign owned enterprises. Thus, the main solution of the owner-
manager problem was either ownership by the managers or more concentrated ownership often 
through foreign investors. This is the background for the increased concentration of ownership in all 
three Baltic countries – and in other countries in Eastern Europe as well (Mygind et al 2006).  
The main governance problem in the current stage with quite concentrated ownership is the 
conflict between majority and minority shareholders. The weak position of minority shareholders is 
indicated by the continuing increase in concentration on the largest single owner. However, the 
most recent legislation and the corporate governance codes introduced in the later years in all the 
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three Baltic countries have strengthened the protection of minority shareholders. Still, the effective-
ness of the legislation – the enforcement - could be developed further. Accompanied by more insti-
tutional investors from the growing pension funds, insurance companies etc. we may in the coming 
years see a development with more minority investors. 
In the coming years we expect more widespread concern for the stakeholder governance 
problem. Some of the large foreign investors have already brought some concern for Corporate So-
cial Responsibility issues, but it has still not much weight in the typical Baltic company. However, 
there is increasing demand for social responsible investments and most experience show that com-
panies giving high priority to CSR also show strong performance in relation to shareholder value. 
The strong ownership position of the employees in the start of transition declined quite fast 
over the transition process. In the later years, employee ownership is still decreasing, and according 
to a recent study (Lowitzsch 2006) there is now no special legislation to promote employee finan-
cial participation in any of the Baltic countries. Thus, the Baltic economies are lacking behind the 
development in EU and US in this field. Some legislation concerning employee representation in 
European companies related to the EU membership is the only initiative in this area in the latest 
years. With the exception of some large foreign owned companies it seems that even in knowledge 
intensive companies where employee ownership is widespread in other countries we find very little 
evidence of employee financial participation. However, with the continuation of the fast develop-
ment and upgrading of the Baltic economies it can be expected that the involvement of this stake-
holder group of employees will get renewed interest. 
 
Conclusion 
Within the last 15 years the three Baltic countries have been through deep changes in politi-
cal and economic institutions. The balance between different stakeholders in relation to the enter-
prises has changed and new stakeholder groups have been formed in the process. Corporate govern-
ance system has gone through different stages both in the individual enterprises and in the general 
model for the given country. So what governance model is now developing in the Baltic countries? 
The privatization process was the starting point for the governance cycle for most medium 
and large enterprises. There were important differences between the Baltic countries with strong 
support for insider takeovers only in the very early years in Estonia and Latvia while Lithuania 
made employee takeovers the dominant model for the bulk of enterprises in the privatization up to 
the mid 1990es. However, the privatization models converged over time. Foreign investors got a 
strong role quite early in Estonia. This trend was followed a few years later in Latvia and direct sale 
to blockholders, often foreign investors, has also been the dominant strategy in Lithuania since the 
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end of the 1990es. In this way the three countries have to a high degree followed the same path, but 
with some variations in speed with Estonia in front and Latvian and Lithuania catching up. 
This is also the case seen in relation to the most important institutions for corporate govern-
ance. Estonia was fastest to implement tough bankruptcy legislation and also fast in relation to a 
more advanced company law. Estonia followed more liberal regimes for business with a quite low 
degree of regulation. In the area of securing the rights of shareholders and minority right protection 
this meant that Estonia at some point was passed by Latvia and Lithuania. A 2004 EBRD-survey 
based on legal experts and practitioners show that minority protection had several flaws in Estonia, 
but recent legislation related to EU-accession in all three countries resulted in important improve-
ments. Still, in the actual implementation minority protection is far from the Anglo-American level.  
The banking system developed fast in Estonia. Early strict legislation on banking in Estonia 
was related to a bank crisis in 1992-93. At this stage the crisis did not result in such strong negative 
consequences as it happened for Latvia and Lithuania in 1995-96. Foreign, specially Scandinavian, 
banks took over most of the banking assets and in the later years we have seen a very high growth 
in loans to the private sector pushing the current boom in construction and investments. Although 
the role of banks in the economies is increasing they do not play a strong role as owners and repre-
sentatives in company boards. Therefore, we do not find signs of the development of a German 
bank-based corporate governance system.  
The stock market developed first in Lithuania in connection with the early privatization 
process, but although many enterprises were listed the general institutional framework did not sup-
port the role of a strong market for ownership control and later most of these companies were de-
listed. Estonia started the stock exchange quite late in 1996, only few companies were listed, but 
capitalization and turnover was quite high for a transitional economy. In the later years the stock 
exchanges in all three countries have been integrated into the Nordic OMX system. Still only a few 
of the leading companies are listed and the bulk of the enterprises are outside the stock exchange. 
The weak development of the stock market gives little support for the Anglo American market 
based system in the Baltics. 
The privatization models and the development in institutions have set a framework for the 
typical transitional governance cycle: employee?manager?external domestic?foreign blockholder. 
Because of the speed of institutional change this happened a little bit earlier in Estonia, but the ten-
dency has been observed in all three countries. Now only very few employee owned companies are 
left. We still see many manager-owned, especially, in new companies, but large blockholder, espe-
cially among foreign companies, have also a strong position. This development has happened in 
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parallel with a strong concentration of ownership. Thus, blockholder ownership is the dominant 
ownership structure for the overwhelming part of the enterprises. 
Corporate governance has been much more advanced through the transitional process. In the 
early years the owner-manager problem was very serious in most companies. When the authority of 
the planners disappeared and liberalization gave room for decisions at the enterprise level managers 
got a very strong position. Because of the deficient institutional framework outside owners had a 
relatively weak position compared to insiders. Together with the privatization models this was the 
reason behind the strong weight on insider ownership in the early stage of transition. Because of the 
continuation of the old paternalistic management style also employees were in a weak position and 
often the governance problem was between employee owners and management. When managers 
took over, and sometimes after outside takeovers, the governance problem between majority and 
minority owners developed. The continued concentration of ownership can be taken as an indicator 
that it is still too early for a development in the direction of more diversified ownership as in the 
Anglo-American model. Stakeholder issues like employee participation and Corporate Social re-
sponsibility have been introduced often through foreign investors, but such issues still have a low 
profile in the three countries.  
In this way there have been an interesting cycle seen in relation to the prevalence and impor-
tance of the different governance problem. We can say that the stakeholder problem was somewhat 
addressed by the weight on employee ownership in the early stage of privatization. However, the 
managers’ appropriation of rights from the employees changed the focus to the manager-owner 
problem. This is still an important governance problem, but now in relation to outside owners. It has 
mainly been solved through concentration of ownership, leaving the floor open for the majority-
minority problem. The stakeholder problem may have a more dominant position in the future. 
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